Stability (no-weak-spoilers): The only hit for this property is this article so WP:OR
Okumaya devam et...
← Previous revision | Revision as of 17:26, 8 May 2024 |
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| The Condorcet criterion is related to several other [[voting system criteria]].<!-- TODO: Strategic voting --> | The Condorcet criterion is related to several other [[voting system criteria]].<!-- TODO: Strategic voting --> |
| === Stability (no-weak-spoilers) === | === Stability (no-weak-spoilers) === |
| Condorcet methods are highly resistant to [[Spoiler effect|spoiler effects]]. Intuitively, this is because the only way to dislodge a Condorcet winner is by beating them, implying spoilers can only exist if there is no majority-rule winner. This property, known as ''stability for majority-rule winners'', is a major advantage of such methods.<ref>{{cite arXiv |last=Schulze |first=Markus |date=2024-03-03 |title=The Schulze Method of Voting | Condorcet methods are highly resistant to [[Spoiler effect|spoiler effects]]. Intuitively, this is because the only way to dislodge a Condorcet winner is by beating them, implying spoilers can only exist if there is no majority-rule winner. |
| |page=351 |class=cs.GT |eprint=1804.02973 |quote=The Condorcet criterion for single-winner elections (section 4.7) is important because, when there is a Condorcet winner b ∈ A, then it is still a Condorcet winner when alternatives a1,...,an ∈ A \ {b} are removed. So an alternative b ∈ A doesn’t owe his property of being a Condorcet winner to the presence of some other alternatives. Therefore, when we declare a Condorcet winner b ∈ A elected whenever a Condorcet winner exists, we know that no other alternatives a1,...,an ∈ A \ {b} have changed the result of the election without being elected.}}</ref> | |
| === Participation === | === Participation === |
Okumaya devam et...