Society and customs: c/e, expand
Okumaya devam et...
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| Initially, the distribution of wealth in the rentier state model was exclusive, with only a select few involved in its creation and allocation, while the majority benefited as recipients. Despite the perception of every Qatari holding a "winning lottery ticket," the reality was that hydrocarbon revenues were controlled by the state and channeled to citizens through specific mechanisms. During Qatar's early years of oil wealth, infrastructure and social services evolved slowly alongside hydrocarbon development. Initial efforts targeted basic needs like electricity, water, healthcare, and education, albeit with a significant portion of oil revenues redirected to the ruler's personal treasury. However, [[Qatar National Unity Front|protests]] in the 1960s during Sheikh [[Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani]]'s rule led to a more equitable distribution of oil revenues, known as the "quarter rule". His successor, Emir [[Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani]], furthered this trend, significantly increasing social aid, housing benefits, and salary increments.<ref name="jocelyn58">{{cite thesis|last1=Mitchell|first1=Jocelyn Sage|url=https://repository.library.georgeto...12332.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y|title=Beyond Allocation: The Politics of Legitimacy in Qatar|pages=58–64|type=Thesis|publisher=Georgetown University|year=2013|accessdate=4 May 2024}}</ref> | Initially, the distribution of wealth in the rentier state model was exclusive, with only a select few involved in its creation and allocation, while the majority benefited as recipients. Despite the perception of every Qatari holding a "winning lottery ticket," the reality was that hydrocarbon revenues were controlled by the state and channeled to citizens through specific mechanisms. During Qatar's early years of oil wealth, infrastructure and social services evolved slowly alongside hydrocarbon development. Initial efforts targeted basic needs like electricity, water, healthcare, and education, albeit with a significant portion of oil revenues redirected to the ruler's personal treasury. However, [[Qatar National Unity Front|protests]] in the 1960s during Sheikh [[Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani]]'s rule led to a more equitable distribution of oil revenues, known as the "quarter rule". His successor, Emir [[Khalifa bin Hamad Al Thani]], furthered this trend, significantly increasing social aid, housing benefits, and salary increments.<ref name="jocelyn58">{{cite thesis|last1=Mitchell|first1=Jocelyn Sage|url=https://repository.library.georgeto...12332.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y|title=Beyond Allocation: The Politics of Legitimacy in Qatar|pages=58–64|type=Thesis|publisher=Georgetown University|year=2013|accessdate=4 May 2024}}</ref> |
| In addition to providing essential services like healthcare, education, and housing—all at no cost to citizens—there are no taxes and an abundance of state benefits, including land grants, interest-free loans, scholarships for students studying abroad, and guaranteed civil service jobs. As a result of these various benefits, some Western analysts have described Qatari citizens as "too rich to care" about disrupting the political system or questioning the legitimacy of its ruler. Despite these outward appearances of prosperity and contentment, recent surveys reveal that some of the Qatari population is dissatisfied with state benefits. While services like healthcare and education enjoy relatively high levels of support, other aspects, such as retirement benefits, receive notably less endorsement.<ref>{{cite thesis|last1=Mitchell|first1=Jocelyn Sage|url=https://repository.library.georgeto...12332.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y|title=Beyond Allocation: The Politics of Legitimacy in Qatar|pages=83–85|type=Thesis|publisher=Georgetown University|year=2013|accessdate=4 May 2024}}</ref> | In addition to providing essential services like healthcare, education, and housing—all at no cost to citizens—there are no taxes and an abundance of state benefits, including land grants, [[Riba|interest-free loans]], scholarships for students studying abroad, and guaranteed [[civil service]] jobs. As a result of these various benefits, some Western analysts have described Qatari citizens as "too rich to care" about disrupting the political system or questioning the legitimacy of its ruler. Despite these outward appearances of prosperity and contentment, recent surveys reveal that some of the Qatari population is dissatisfied with state benefits. While services like healthcare and education enjoy relatively high levels of support, other aspects, such as [[Pension|retirement benefits]], receive notably less endorsement.<ref>{{cite thesis|last1=Mitchell|first1=Jocelyn Sage|url=https://repository.library.georgeto...12332.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y|title=Beyond Allocation: The Politics of Legitimacy in Qatar|pages=83–85|type=Thesis|publisher=Georgetown University|year=2013|accessdate=4 May 2024}}</ref> Furthermore, the degree of government privileges afforded can vary depending on the family's social standing.<ref name="expatica"/> |
| ===Foreigners=== | ===Foreigners=== |
| [[File:Construction laborers having an on the job meeting in Onaiza Qatar.jpg|thumb|Construction laborers in Doha]] | [[File:Construction laborers having an on the job meeting in Onaiza Qatar.jpg|thumb|Construction laborers in Doha]] |
| Foreigners make up 85% to 90% of Qatar's population of 2.7 million, with migrant workers making up approximately 95% of the workforce. [[South Asia]] and [[Southeast Asia]] are the primary regions which migrants come from. Societal divisions exist depending on the origin of a foreigner, with Europeans, North Americans, and Arabs typically securing better job opportunities and social privileges than sub-Saharan Africans and South Asians.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Pattison|first1=Pete|url=https://www.theguardian.com/global-...racism-but-qatar-is-not-the-victim|title=This World Cup should be remembered for its racism. But Qatar is not the victim|publisher=The Guardian|date=19 December 2022|accessdate=4 May 2024}}</ref> Socialization between foreigners and Qataris is slightly limited due to language barriers and vastly different religious and cultural customs.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Camacho|first1=Beatriz|url=https://www.expatica.com/qa/living/...ocial-etiquette-in-qatar-70936/|title=Culture and social etiquette in Qatar|publisher=Expatica|accessdate=4 May 2024}}</ref> | Foreigners constitute 85% to 90% of Qatar's population of 2.7 million, with migrant workers making up approximately 95% of the workforce. [[South Asia]] and [[Southeast Asia]] are the primary regions which migrants come from. Societal divisions exist depending on the origin of the foreigner, with Europeans, North Americans, and Arabs typically securing better job opportunities and social privileges than sub-Saharan Africans and South Asians.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Pattison|first1=Pete|url=https://www.theguardian.com/global-...racism-but-qatar-is-not-the-victim|title=This World Cup should be remembered for its racism. But Qatar is not the victim|publisher=The Guardian|date=19 December 2022|accessdate=4 May 2024}}</ref> Socialization between foreigners and Qataris is slightly limited due to language barriers and different religious and cultural customs.<ref name="expatica">{{cite web|last1=Camacho|first1=Beatriz|url=https://www.expatica.com/qa/living/...ocial-etiquette-in-qatar-70936/|title=Culture and social etiquette in Qatar|publisher=Expatica|accessdate=4 May 2024}}</ref> |
| The [[Human rights in Qatar|human rights]] of migrant workers is limited by the country's [[Kafala system]], which stipulates their requirement of a Qatari sponsor and regulates their entry and exit.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/world-report/20...her 100,000 are domestic workers.|title=World Report 2020: Qatar|publisher=Human Rights Watch|accessdate=4 May 2024}}</ref> Prospective migrant workers from origin countries sometimes face exorbitant recruitment fees, surpassing government-set limits, paid to licensed and unlicensed recruitment entities. These charges, ranging from $600 to $5,000, often force workers into debt and compel them to sell family assets. Government-to-government agreements have emerged in recent years to mitigate opaque recruitment practices and worker exploitation. Many companies in Qatar skirt local laws, resulting in workers facing delayed or non-payment of wages. While some employers deposit wages into bank accounts, most workers are paid in cash without detailed pay slips, hindering evidence of payment and complicating remittances. Additionally, the confiscation of passports by employers is a common practice in Qatar which limits the workers' freedom of movement and exposes them to potential exploitation.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Jureidini|first1=Ray|url=https://www.qscience.com/docserver/...9DF5F994160EFE41252627025A24608|title=Migrant Labour Recruitment to Qatar|chapter=Executive Summary and Recommendations|isbn=978-9927-101-75-5|year=2014|publisher=Qatar Foundation}}</ref> | The [[Human rights in Qatar|human rights]] of migrant workers is limited by the country's [[Kafala system]], which stipulates their requirement of a Qatari sponsor and regulates their entry and exit.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/world-report/20...her 100,000 are domestic workers.|title=World Report 2020: Qatar|publisher=Human Rights Watch|accessdate=4 May 2024}}</ref> Prospective migrant workers from origin countries sometimes face exorbitant recruitment fees, surpassing government-set limits, paid to licensed and unlicensed [[Employment agency|recruitment agencies]]. These charges, ranging from $600 to $5,000, often force workers into debt and compel them to sell family assets. Government-to-government agreements have emerged in recent years to mitigate opaque recruitment practices and worker exploitation. Many companies in Qatar skirt local laws, resulting in workers facing delayed or non-payment of wages. While some employers deposit wages into bank accounts, most workers are paid in cash without detailed pay slips, hindering evidence of payment and complicating remittances. Additionally, the confiscation of passports by employers is a common practice in Qatar which limits the workers' freedom of movement and exposes them to potential exploitation.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Jureidini|first1=Ray|url=https://www.qscience.com/docserver/...9DF5F994160EFE41252627025A24608|title=Migrant Labour Recruitment to Qatar|chapter=Executive Summary and Recommendations|isbn=978-9927-101-75-5|year=2014|publisher=Qatar Foundation}}</ref> |
| === Language === | === Language === |
Okumaya devam et...